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Abstract
We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with
conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensation-
based and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the man-
ager’s decision-making expertise against the cost of ensuring that the manager uses his discre-
tion productively. Reputational incentives reduce the necessary monetary incentives to discourage
purely opportunistic behavior, but may cause the manager to pursue conservative courses of ac-
tion to preserve his reputation. This undermines the benefits of delegating control, leading to
decreased managerial authority and stronger monetary incentives. When the principal can commit
to long-term contracts, she eliminates this conservative bias by rewarding a successful manager
with greater future compensation and authority than would be optimal in a static setting. Early
in the relationship the principal may delegate additional authority in order to screen for managers
of high ability.
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1 Introduction
Delegating control over production and investment decisions enables managers to better utilize their
information, knowledge, and skills. Investors, for example, transfer control over their capital to en-
trepreneurs and professional managers precisely because they expect that managers can use the funds
more productively. However, managers with a free hand may squander investors’ capital either in-
advertently through poor decision-making or by knowingly undertaking unproductive projects from
which they derive personal benefit. A principal can address potential conflicts of interest either by
using incentive contracts or by simply limiting the authority of a manager. In practice, parties write
contracts which use both of these instruments. For example, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) find that
the contracts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs both specify claims on cash-flows (in-
centives) and allocate a constellation of control rights (authority) which are typically contingent on
performance.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic principal-agent model and analyze how a manager’s concern
about his reputation and the horizon of the relationship between a principal and manager affect the
allocation of authority and the design of compensation. In our framework, a manager has potentially
better information than the principal about the firm’s best course of action. To benefit from this
information, the principal must grant the manager some decision-making authority. Like Holmstro¨m
(1984), we model authority as the freedom to choose from a certain set of actions; expanding the set of
actions allows the manager to use his information more efficiently, but is costly since the manager can
engage in opportunistic behavior. The key difference between our model and the existing literature is
that we allow for both explicit incentives (compensation contracts) and implicit incentives (concerns
about future career opportunities).1
In order to isolate the effects that are relevant for our analysis of the dynamic problem we start by
analyzing a static setting. We find that the optimal level of discretion is determined by balancing the
value of the manager’s information against the cost of the explicit incentives required to ensure that
the manager uses his authority productively. Whenever the manager has an informational advantage
over the principal, the principal grants him authority and provides explicit incentives.
The primary focus of our analysis is on how dynamic considerations impact either the benefit or the
cost side of this tradeoff between utilizing the manager’s superior information and limiting the cost of
compensation. The quality of the manager and his ability to generate useful information is uncertain,
1Related papers include, for example, Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Krishna and Morgan (2008). We defer the
discussion of the relationship of our paper to the literature to Section 5.
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introducing a role for reputational concerns. We find that these concerns always make managers less
inclined to abuse their discretion and pursue private benefits. Career concerns thus lower the explicit
compensation necessary to discourage opportunism. However, we also find that career concerns can
lead managers to ignore their private information (the very reason for granting them authority) and
avoid taking actions that place their reputation at risk. In such a scenario, it is optimal for a principal
to both limit a manager’s discretion (centralize decision-making) and to increase the reward for taking
risks.
An important result from our analysis is that whether career concerns decrease the incentives of
managers to use their authority productively depends on the returns to building a better reputation.
When the potential gain in reputational capital from taking risks is high relative to the potential
loss (i.e., when a manager’s future compensation is convex in his perceived talent), managers have an
incentive to act on their private information to distinguish themselves as superior decision-makers.
In this case, career concerns lower the amount of explicit incentive compensation necessary to induce
managers to use their discretion productively; the principal takes advantage of the improved alignment
by granting managers greater authority than in the case without career concerns. On the other hand, if
managers primarily fear damaging their reputations, such as when poor performance vastly diminishes
their labor market opportunities, they avoid making decisions that are informative about their ability
and choose conservative courses of action. In this circumstance, it is costly to induce managers to
use their authority productively.2 A principal preempts a manager’s tendency to act conservatively
by both providing stronger incentives and further centralizing decision-making. Hence it is a unique
implication of our analysis that implicit incentives substitute for the explicit incentives necessary to
discourage obvious forms of opportunism, but may simultaneously force a principal to use stronger
explicit incentives to encourage managers to act on their knowledge and take risks. For example, in
the context of asset management, our theory suggests that a senior portfolio manager will counter
the tendency of a junior portfolio manager to closely track his benchmark index and avoid risks
by either closely supervising investment decisions or providing greater rewards for outperformance.
I.e., managerial conservatism manifests itself not only directly through managerial behavior, but also
indirectly through costly adaptations by organizations.
In much of our analysis, we assume that the principal has only a short-term relationship with a
manager and cannot write long-term contracts. However, when a principal can commit to long-term
2This bias towards conservative actions is reminiscent of the literature on “herding”. There, under certain circumstances,
managers want to avoid “standing out”, ignore substantive private information, and simply mimic the investment deci-
sions of other managers, which results in inefficient investment decisions.
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contracts, we show that she counters the conservative bias of managers by making the future payoffs
to talented managers higher than would prevail in the market otherwise. In particular, managers are
promised greater authority and compensation in the future to motivate them early in their careers to
take risks. In reality, long-term contracts can be implemented by pay and promotion policies. These
policies therefore play an important role in facilitating the decentralization of decision-making.
There is an important additional consideration present in long-term relationships, which unambigu-
ously increases a manager’s level of authority. The success or failure of a project is revealing about a
manager’s ability only to the extent that the manager has decision-making authority. In the extreme
case, if an employee is simply told which action to take by a superior, there is little basis for evaluat-
ing the employee’s capabilities. Consequently, discretion has informational benefits and allows future
employers and lenders to learn about the ability of managers. When the principal expects to have an
extended relationship with the manager, she internalizes this information externality, and increases
the manager’s level of discretion at the outset of the relationship.
The next section introduces the baseline model, which illustrates the basic tradeoffs, and links
discretion to reputation, the value of information, and conflicts of interest. Section 3 extends the
model to a two period setting and analyzes the role of career concerns. While in Section 3 we assume
that the relationship between any principal and any manager lasts only one period, Section 4 extends
the analysis to long-term relationships without and with commitment to long-term contracts. Finally,
Section 5 relates our analysis to the literature and Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains the
proofs.
2 The Static Model
To analyze the tradeoff between retaining control and granting greater discretion, we construct a model
in which a principal (she) and a manager (he) enter into a contractual relationship and undertake a
project. The manager has potentially better information about the optimal course of action, and the
principal can benefit from this information only by giving the manager discretion over the project.
However, two factors make discretion costly: (i) uncertainty about the manager’s talent and (ii)
conflicts of interest. Here, we describe the informational structure, incongruity between the principal’s
and agent’s preferences, and contracting environment, and solve the basic model to set the stage for
the dynamic analysis in the subsequent sections.
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2.1 Information, Projects, and Payoffs
To capture the manager’s superior information, we assume that the manager privately receives a signal
s about the state of world ω. ω is drawn from a distribution F (ω) with support [0, 1] and a strictly
positive density, f(ω). There are two types of managers: informed (high types) and uninformed (low
types). s = ω for an informed manager, while s is an independent draw from F (.) for an uninformed
manager. In other words, the manager is either perfectly informed or completely uninformed. Neither
the principal nor the manager know the manager’s type. Intuitively, imagine a novice manager who
does not yet know whether or not he is good at his job and hence has in this respect no informational
advantage over his employer. Only over time his true ability is revealed. The assumption is important
because it rules out ex ante asymmetric information between the two parties, which could potentially
be mitigated by screening mechanisms (see Footnote 3). The probability that the manager is informed
is θ and is common knowledge. We identify the manager’s reputation with beliefs about his type, which
in the static model is fixed at the prior θ.
There is a continuum of possible actions a ∈ [0, 1]. The profitability pi of action a depends on the
state of the world, and it is 1 if a = ω and zero otherwise. Therefore, an informed manager can
generate a profit of 1 by choosing an action equal to his observed signal, while an uninformed manager
generates an expected profit of 0. This 0−1 setup does not drive the results, but simplifies the analysis
as follows: (i) it simplifies the principal’s inference problem as low types cannot get lucky and generate
high profit and (ii) it reduces the complexity of the set of monetary contracts as the realized profit is
a simple discrete variable.
In addition to a ∈ [0, 1], there is an action a¯, which maintains the status quo and yields a profit
of R, independent of the state of the word. We refer to a¯ as the “standard action”. A crucial
feature of the standard action, especially relevant in a dynamic context, is that the manager can avoid
inferences about his ability by taking this action. For example, each value of a might represent a
possible acquisition, the size of which is increasing in a. In this case, the action a¯ corresponds to not
acquiring any firm at all, and ω is the optimal acquisition. So choosing a¯ is equivalent to following a
conservative course of action that does not require particularly outstanding abilities and is hence not
informative with respect to the manager’s talent.3
3If the manager privately knew his type, he would never generate zero profit. High types would always follow their
signal (unless they were constrained to take the standard action) and low types would never follow their signal and
instead choose the standard action. Given this behavior, the choice of the standard action would reveal some of the
manager’s private information to the principal. In the extreme, the principal could grant the manager full discretion.
If the manager took the standard action, the principal would conclude with certainty that the manager is the low type
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When the manager acts on his information he generates a profit of 1 with probability θ, i.e. the
probability that his signal accurately reflects the state of the world. A benchmark profit of R can
be generated without any information by simply always taking the standard action. Hence θ − R
represents the expected value of the manager’s information. To make the problem interesting we
assume that θ > R as the reason for giving the manager discretion is precisely to allow the manager
to exploit his information and increase the profit of the project.
However, the interests of the manager are not perfectly aligned with those of the principal. We
assume that the manager derives a private non-contractible benefit from taking actions, b(a) with
b′(a) > 0. This implies that, all else equal, the manager prefers to take larger actions. For example,
if each action a represents a possible acquisition, b(a) captures the manager’s predilection for large
acquisitions or “empire-building”. We assume that b(1) < R, which implies that private benefits are
small relative to the cash-flows of the project, and that it is always efficient to induce the manager
to take profitable actions rather than maximize private benefits. Furthermore we assume that b(0) =
b(a¯) = 0, i.e. the standard action does not yield any private benefits. The last assumption simplifies
the exposition but our results are qualitatively unchanged as long as R + b(a¯) < θ, i.e. as long as it is
efficient to utilize the manager’s information.
The manager is risk-neutral with respect to his monetary income, m, and his utility is given by
u(m,a) = m + b(a).
Unlike the manager, the principal values only the profits from the project and is risk-neutral as well.
We assume that the manager is wealth constrained. The assumption approximates the (presumably
fairly typical) situation where the cash flows of the project are large relative to the personal wealth
of the manager. It rules out the possibility to implement the first best by making the risk-neutral
manager residual claimant, which amounts to selling the project.
because the high type, having full discretion, would never find it profitable to take the standard action. The assumption
of private information would not qualitatively change our results in the static model, since the information learned in that
model has no value to the principal (there is no continuation). It would impact the analysis of the dynamic model in two
ways. First, the effect of career concerns would be limited to disciplining the manager not to blatantly abuse authority.
The concept of negative “returns to reputation-building” would not arise because high types are always willing to take
informationally intensive actions, while low types always avoid them. Second, the principal would have an incentive to
grant more discretion in the first period in order to make a more accurate inference from the manager having taken the
standard action (we analyze an analogous effect in Section 4.1).
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2.2 Contracts
The principal limits the manager’s opportunistic behavior by restricting the set of actions under his
control. Formally, the principal chooses a compact set A, where A ⊆ [0, 1], and allows the manager
to choose actions only from A or A ∪ {a¯}, depending on whether the standard action is included
in the manager’s choice set.4 We say that the manager has more authority if he has a larger set of
actions from which to choose, or, formally, A gives the agent more discretion than A′ if A′ ⊂ A.
The assumption that the principal can ex ante limit the manager to a certain set of actions is made
primarily for expositional reasons. Alternatively, we could assume that the manager always reports to
the principal, who either approves or discards his suggestion. In this alternative approach, a manager
effectively has more discretion – or what Aghion and Tirole (1997) call real authority – when the
principal is more likely to accept his proposals. Appendix A analyzes the problem using this latter
approach.
The other instrument the principal uses to limit the opportunistic behavior of the manager is explicit
monetary incentives. She offers the manager a compensation package tied to the profits of the project.
While the principal can offer contracts contingent on profit, we assume that compensation cannot be
made contingent on the action. In this regard, contracts are incomplete (see Grossman and Hart (1986)
and Hart and Moore (1990)). We make this assumption mainly to simplify the analysis. However,
there is arguably a tension in the assumption that the principal can restrict the manager’s set of
actions, but cannot write compensation contracts that depend on actions. In Appendix A we remove
this assumption and allow for compensation contracts to be contingent on all observable variables.
The results are qualitatively similar, since it is the asymmetry of information that forces the principal
to grant the manager effective control.
We denote by β (bonus) and σ (salary) the payments to the manager when the profit is 1 and
R, respectively. The principal never finds it optimal to offer a payment when the profit is 0, since
the manager is risk-neutral. As the manager is protected by limited liability, all payments must be
non-negative. Furthermore, since b(a¯) = 0, we can assume without loss of generality that the standard
action is always included in the choice set of the manager. In particular, if the principal does not
want the manager to take the standard action, she can simply set σ = 0. Though the choice set of the
manager is formally A ∪ {a¯}, we henceforth abuse notation and simply refer to the set as A.
Summarizing, a contract specifies the manager’s compensation and authority and has the form
{β, σ,A}. Once the terms of the contract have been set, the manager privately observes his signal, s,
4Compactness is necessary to ensure existence of the maximum in the manager’s choice program.
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and chooses an action. The action and the state of the world determine the project’s profits, which
in turn, determines the managers compensation.
2.3 The Optimal Contract
Given a contract C = {β, σ,A} and a signal s, the manager’s expected utility from taking action a is
E[u |s, C] =


θβ + b(s) if a = s
σ if a = a¯
b(a) otherwise.
(1)
Let a∗(s, C) be the manager’s best response.5 In addition, let l ≡ maxA be the largest action that
the manager can take. If the manager chooses to maximize his private benefit, he will choose a = l,
since b(a) is increasing in a, and his payoff is b(l). For s ∈ A, the manager’s payoff from taking the
action corresponding to his signal (a = s) is given by the first line of equation (1). In particular, the
manager receives the payment β if his information is correct, in addition to the private benefit derived
from taking the action. The manager, like the principal, does not know whether or not he is informed
and hence receives β with probability θ. Finally, the manager can choose the standard action, a¯, for
a payoff of σ. Note that one of these three actions always weakly dominates any other action; that is,
a∗(s, C) ∈ {s, a¯, l}.
The principal’s expected payoff is θ(1−β) from action s, R−σ from a¯, and 0 from l. The principal’s
expected payoff from contract C is therefore:
V (C, θ) = θ(1− β) Pr
[
a∗(s, C) = s
]
+ (R− σ) Pr
[
a∗(s, C) = a¯
]
. (2)
The optimal choice of C maximizes V (C, θ). The following lemma provides a partial characterization
of the optimal contract:
Lemma 1 For any contract C, there is a contract C˜ that (i) allows the manager to choose an action
from an interval [k, l]; (ii) induces the manager to utilize his information whenever possible and to
choose the standard action otherwise (e.g., a∗(s, Cˆ) = s for s ∈ [k, l] and a∗ = a¯ otherwise); and (iii)
gives the principal at least as much utility as C.
5In particular, a∗(s, C) ∈ arg max
a∈A E[u |s, C]. Without loss of generality, we assume that a
∗(s, C) is a pure strategy.
Roughly speaking, mixed strategies can be ruled out since the principal always has a preferred action she would like the
manager to take. Therefore, if the manager’s response involves mixing across actions, the principal responds by slightly
adjusting the compensation payments.
7
Proof. The proof of this lemma and all other proofs are collected in Appendix B.
Lemma 1 allows us to restrict the search for the optimal A to intervals. Also, we need only consider
contracts in which the manager takes the action corresponding to his signal when he has the authority
to do so and the standard action when he lacks authority. To the extent that it is costly to induce
the manager to behave that way (as we will shortly see), the optimal contract does not generally give
the manager full discretion. In order to simplify the analysis of optimal intervals [k, l], we assume
throughout the rest of the paper that the marginal private benefit of action a normalized by the
likelihood of that action being optimal is strictly increasing.
Assumption 1 b′(a)/f(a) ≡ v(a) is strictly increasing.
The function v(a) can be considered a measure of the severity of conflict of interests. Intuitively,
when there is little likelihood that the optimal action is in the neighborhood of a, but there is an
opportunity to extract greater private benefit, the conflict of interests is severe at a. Imagine, for
example, that the principal must decide whether to increase the manager’s budget by $10 million,
which would allow the manager to invest in a new technology whose cost exceeds his current budget.
Also imagine that the manager would derive an incremental private benefit of $1 million from the
investment. The propensity of the manager to lobby for the budget increase is the same irrespective
of the likelihood that the investment in the new technology is optimal. However, the likelihood of
the optimality of the technology determines the principal’s attitude towards the manager’s lobbying
efforts. If the probability that the new technology is optimal is 1%, the principal will be rather opposed
to the manager’s request; if the probability is 60%, he will be more willing to consider it. In this sense,
the conflict of interest between the principal and the manager is more severe in the former case than
the latter.6
Under Assumption 1, the optimal choice ofA places an upper bound on the actions that the manager
can take (e.g., places limits on the size of investments), while allowing complete discretion below that
bound. The following proposition formalizes this intuition:
6Another interpretation of v(a) is the minimum value the manager must be able to generate to make the principal willing
to give the manager more discretion in the neighborhood of a. To see this, suppose that the principal must decide
whether to give the manager more discretion, by extending A from [k, l] to [k, l + ǫ]. The benefit to expanding the
discretion of the manager is the increased probability that the optimal action is taken, times the value that the optimal
action generates: (F (l + ǫ) − F (l))v ≡ ∆Fv. The cost of expanding discretion comes from the the fact that, if the
manager chooses to behave opportunistically, he can increase his private benefit by b(l + ǫ) − b(l) ≡ ∆b. The principal
can induce the manager not to abuse his discretion and still benefit only if ∆Fv ≥ ∆b. Dividing by ǫ and taking the
limit as ǫ goes to zero, the equation becomes, f(l)v ≥ b′(l) or v(l) ≥ b′(l)/f(l).
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Proposition 1 The optimal interval of discretion has the form [0, l].
Proposition 1 reduces the choice of A to a univariate problem. In particular, the degree of discretion
granted to the manager can be identified with l. Managers with a higher limit have greater freedom
to choose the course of action.
The incentive compatibility conditions associated with any contract satisfying Lemma 1 and Propo-
sition 1 are
σ ≥ b(l) (3)
θβ + b(a) ≥ σ for a ∈ [0, l] (4)
where equation (3) ensures that the manager always prefers the standard action over the action
that maximizes his private benefit, while equation (4) ensures that the manager takes the action
corresponding to his signal whenever possible. Note that if condition (4) holds at a = 0, then the
inequality holds for all a and that, for a contract to be optimal, the incentive compatibility conditions
must bind at a = 0. Therefore, equations (3) and (4) reduce to
θβ = σ = b(l) (5)
which provides a simple relationship between β, σ, and l, and establishes that the manager’s com-
pensation package is increasing in the level of discretion, i.e. managers with extensive control over
a project must be compensated generously in order not to abuse their discretion. These results are
summarized in the next corollary:
Corollary 1 The incentive payments of the optimal contract must satisfy θβ = σ = b(l), implying
that incentives are increasing in the level of discretion.
2.4 The Allocation of Authority
Given Corollary 1, the principal’s problem reduces from selecting the triple {β, σ,A} to select-
ing the best contract of the form {b(l)/θ, b(l), [0, l]}, i.e. choosing the optimal l. Substituting
{b(l)/θ, b(l), [0, l]} and the managers best response, a∗(s), into the principal’s profit function (equation
(2)) yields the following maximization problem:7
max
l∈[0,1]
V (l) = R + (θ −R)F (l)− b(l) (6)
7Omitted from the principal’s maximization problem is a participation constraint. We implicitly assume that the rents
the manager receives in order to make the optimal contract incentive compatible exceed his reservation utility. If the
rents are not sufficient, the principal will increase l till β(l) and σ(l) provide the required level of compensation.
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The profit function reflects the fact that the principal can always earn at least R; and by giving the
manager a level of discretion l and a compensation package with an expected value of b(l), the principal
can earn an additional profit of θ−R with probability F (l). We restrict attention to interior optima.
The existence of an interior optimum is ensured if the conflict of interests in the neighborhood of zero
is not too severe and the conflict of interests in the neighborhood of one is severe.8 The first-order
condition is
(θ −R)f(l) = b′(l)
or equivalently
θ −R = v(l) (7)
The marginal benefit of increasing the manager’s discretion is the expected value of the manager’s
information, θ − R, times the increased likelihood, f(l), that the manager will be able to utilize
his information. The marginal cost of greater discretion is b′(l), which reflects the higher expected
compensation required to induce the manager to take the correct action. Equivalently, at the optimal
level of discretion, the value of the manager’s information must equal the minimum value, v(l), required
to resolve the conflict of interests at the margin. Hence, the optimal degree of discretion is determined
by trading off the benefits of decentralized decision-making against the costs created by conflicts of
interest. The next proposition establishes that there is a unique level of discretion which maximizes
the principal’s profit, and summarizes how discretion varies with the parameters of the model:
Proposition 2 The optimal level of discretion is unique and is given by the solution to equation
(7). In addition, the optimal level of discretion increases in the potential benefit from better decision
making, 1−R, increases in reputation, θ, and decreases in the severity of the conflict of interests, v.
Proposition 2 is consistent with casual observation. Activities which are not easily standardized and
which are information intensive, warrant greater delegation of control. In addition, management
positions involving a high degree of discretion are filled by individuals with high perceived ability
(high θ) and offer generous incentive compensation.
3 The Dynamic Model
We now extend our analysis to a dynamic setting in which the manager’s current choices influence
his future reputation. We do so by a simple repetition of the static model over two periods. In this
8Formally, v(0) < (θ − R) < v(1) must hold. A sufficient condition for the existence of an interior optimum is that the
private benefit, b(a), satisfies b′(0) = 0 and b′(1) = +∞, an analog of the Inada conditions on production functions.
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section, we assume that the relationship between the principal and the manager lasts for only one
period and in the second period the manager forms a relationship with a new employer. In sections
4.1 and 4.2, we consider the case in which the principal may have an extended relationship with the
manager. The assumption, that the length of the relation is exogenously fixed to one period is for
example sensible in environments in which deals are made on a project by project basis. In that
case, as for example argued in Holmstro¨m (1999), implicit incentives are provided by the labor (or
capital) market, which uses the manager’s past performance as the basis for determining his level of
compensation and authority in subsequent relationships. The notation for all variables is the same,
except a time subscript is added to indicate the period. The manager maximizes the expectation of
the discounted sum of the single-period utilities, U = u1 + δu2, where δ is the discount factor and ui
is the manager’s payoff in time period i.
3.1 The First-Period Equilibrium
As in the static model, the principal and the manager enter the first period with a common belief θ
that the manager is informed. The market then observes the manager’s choice of a1 and the resulting
profit pi1 and updates its belief to θˆ(a1, pi1). In the second period, the manager enters into a new
contract with a new principal. In the analysis that follows, we derive a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
We require that (i) the second-period contract and the manager’s best response must be optimal
given θˆ(a1, pi1); (ii) the first-period contract and the manager’s best response must be optimal given
the second-period strategies; and (iii) beliefs θˆ(a1, pi1) must be consistent with Bayes rule whenever
possible.
Using backward induction, the optimal contract in the second period is equal to the optimal contract
derived in the analysis of the static model. Specifically, the second-period contract is
{
β∗2 , σ
∗
2,A
∗
2
}
=
{
b
(
l2(θˆ)
)
/θˆ, b
(
l2(θˆ)
)
, [0, l2(θˆ)]
}
,
where l2(θˆ) solves equation (6) and is the optimal level of discretion for a manager with reputation
θˆ. Again, the manager’s best response in the second period is to take the action corresponding to his
signal when possible and take the standard action otherwise. Slightly abusing notation, let u2(θˆ) be
the manager’s expected utility from such a contract in the second period. Substituting the manager’s
best response into equation (1), we have that
u2(θˆ) ≡ E[u2 |β
∗
2 , σ
∗
2,A
∗
2, θˆ] = b
(
l2(θˆ)
)
+
∫ l2(θˆ)
0
b(s) f(s)ds. (8)
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The payoff is increasing in θˆ, so the manager unambiguously prefers to be perceived as a more informed
type. Moreover, u2(0) = 0, so that the manager receives no compensation when he is believed to be
the low type with certainty.
The following proposition characterizes the first-period contract and the manager’s best response.
As in the static model, the manager takes the action corresponding to his signal on an interval and
the standard action otherwise. The market beliefs associated with this equilibrium are compelling:
managers who utilize their information are inferred as low types if they earn low profits and high types
if they earn high profits, and the inference is unchanged when managers earn the intermediate level
of profit, R.
Proposition 3 There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which the first-period contract is of the
form {β1, σ1, [0, l1]}. The manager’s response, a
∗
1, and the market’s beliefs θˆ are such that
a∗1 =


s1 s1 ∈ [0, l1]
a¯ otherwise
and θˆ =


1 if pi1 = 1
θ if pi1 = R
0 if pi1 = 0
Moreover, the optimal incentive payments satisfy:
σ1 = max{b(l1)− δu2(θ), 0} (9)
θβ1 = max{σ1 + δ(u2(θ)− θu2(1)), 0}. (10)
Notice that the incentive payments β1 and σ1 are functions of u2(θ) and u2(1), the manager’s second-
period payoff when his reputation is θ and 1, respectively. As before, explicit incentives are necessary
to induce the manager to use his authority productively. However, in choosing an action in the first
period, the manager must consider the impact of that action on his future compensation.
The equilibrium in Proposition 3 is not the unique equilibrium of the game. It can be shown,
however, that the game has two classes of equilibria. The first class includes a continuum of equilibria
in which the manager always takes the standard action.9 We consider such equilibria economically
uninteresting.10 The second class includes equilibria in which the manager takes some actions from
[0, 1] with a positive probability. In these equilibria, all three profit levels are observed and beliefs are
9These equilibria are supported by off-equilibrium path beliefs that “punish” successful managers. For example, (1) the
principal in the first period offers an epsilon interval of discretion and zero monetary incentives, (2) the manager in the
first period always takes the standard action, (3) the market beliefs are θˆ(0) = 0, θˆ(R) = θ, and θˆ(1) = 0, (4) the contract
offered and the manager’s behavior in the second period are as derived in the static model.
10We conjecture that if the concept of sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson (1982)) was generalized to games with a
continuum of actions, these “degenerate” equilibria would not be sequential equilibria.
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thus fully derived using Bayes law. It can be further shown that the equilibrium in Proposition 3 is
the unique equilibrium in the second class.11
3.2 Career Concerns and Explicit Incentives
When the equilibrium incentive payments, β1 and σ1, are positive, equations (9) and (10) reduce to:
σ1 = b(l1)− δu2(θ) (11)
θβ1 − σ1 = δ(u2(θ)− θu2(1)). (12)
If the manager seeks to maximize his private benefit, he receives b(l1). In the static model (and thus
in the second period of the dynamic model), the incentive payment σ2 for a manager who is given
discretion l1 must equal b(l1) to discourage the manager from pursuing pure private benefits. In the
first period, if the manager uses his discretion rather than takes the standard action, his performance
will be poor, and the market will infer that he is not a capable manager. The manager will consequently
lose δu2(θ) in future compensation, in addition to losing any current incentive compensation. Hence,
the manager is more hesitant to knowingly abuse his discretion if his reputation is at stake. The
principal takes the career concerns into account and lowers the explicit incentive payment so that
σ1 = b(l1)− δu2(θ). An immediate implication of equation (11) is that σ1 ≤ σ2, holding fixed the level
of discretion l and the reputation of the manager.
However, the effect of career concerns on the manager’s willingness to utilize his private information
is more subtle. While in the static setting θβ = σ, equation (12) implies that θβ1 does not generally
equal σ1. Career concerns change the relative cost of inducing the manager to take information-
intensive actions. Specifically, the relative cost is θβ1−σ1 and depends on the term θu2(1)−u2(θ). If
θu2(1) exceeds u2(θ), a manager with reputation θ prefers a gamble in which his reputation is revealed
relative to simply maintaining his current reputation. In such a gamble, the manager is revealed to be
the high type with probability θ and receives future compensation u2(1); with probability 1− θ, the
manager is revealed to be the low type and receives no future compensation. The difference θu2(1)−
u2(θ) is therefore the manager’s net expected return from risking his current level of reputational
capital (excluding any explicit period-one incentive payments).
Definition 1 The return to reputation-building is positive (negative) if θu2(1)− u2(θ) ≥ (<)0.
If the return to reputation-building is positive, career concerns make the manager more inclined to
11A more formal treatment of this argument is given in Appendix C.
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utilize his private information since doing so reveals his type and yields high expected reputational
returns. In this case, the principal can lower the incentive payment for information-intensive actions
relative to the standard action, implying that θβ1 ≤ σ1. When the return to reputation-building is
negative, the manager requires more generous compensation to take “revealing” actions, and we have
that θβ1 > σ1. We summarize the preceding discussion with the following corollary to Proposition 3:
Corollary 2 Career concerns lower the cost of inducing the manager to take the standard action;
that is, σ1 ≤ σ2 for any given level of discretion of l and reputation θ. Moreover, if the return to
reputation-building is positive (negative), then career concerns make it relatively less (more) costly to
induce the manager to take information-intensive actions. That is, θβ1 − σ1 ≤ (>)0.
If u2(θ) is convex (concave) in θ, then θu2(1)− u2(θ) ≥ (<)0.
12 A direct implication is:
Lemma 2 The return to reputation-building is positive (negative), when the manager’s second-period
payoff, u2(θ), is convex (concave) in his second-period reputation.
Corollary 2 and Lemma 2 together imply that if increases in the manager’s reputation have increasing
marginal benefits, then the manager has a strong incentive to distinguish himself as a capable decision-
maker. u2(θ) is convex if discretion increases rapidly as the manager’s reputation improves, and if
the increase in discretion is accompanied by large increases in both explicit compensation and private
benefits, as is the case when b(·) is convex. To get some sense of when u2(θ) is convex, recall that
v(·) is a measure of the severity of the conflict of interests. v is strictly increasing, allowing us to
rewrite equation (7) as l2(θ) = v
−1(θ − R). A direct implication of the preceding equation is that
l2(θ) is convex if and only if v(·) is concave. Intuitively, discretion increases rapidly as the manager’s
reputation improves only if the conflict of interests does not worsen too rapidly as the manager gains
greater control. A sufficient (though not necessary) condition for the convexity of u2(θ) is that l2(θ)
and F (·) be convex. The fact that v(·) = b′(·)/f(·) is increasing and F (·) is convex, implies that b(·) is
convex as well. Intuitively, if discretion and private benefits are convex in the manager’s reputation,
then u2(θ) is convex as well. An example for such a situation arises when “stars” in the market are
rewarded disproportionately relative to managers with average reputations. Conversely, if u2(θ) is
concave, the market disproportionately punishes weak performers, and managers have an incentive to
take conservative actions in order to avoid placing their reputational capital at risk.
12When u2(·) is linear, θu2(1)−u2(θ) = 0. I.e., when u2(·) grows more (i.e. is convex) or less (i.e. is concave) than linearly,
than θu2(1)− u2(θ) ≥ (<)0.
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3.3 Career Concerns and the Allocation of Authority
Substituting the manager’s best response, a∗1, given in Proposition 3, into the profit function (2) results
in the first-period maximization problem for the principal:
max
l1∈[0,1]
V1(l1) = R + (θ −R)F (l1)− (θβ1 − σ1)F (l1)− σ1. (13)
The profit function is similar to that in the previous section (equation (6)). One important difference is
the additional term, (θβ1−σ1)F (l1). As discussed above, θβ1−σ1 represents the cost of implementing
information-intensive actions relative to the standard action, while F (l1) is the probability that the
manager takes such an action. As this cost increases, the marginal benefit of granting discretion
decreases.
From Corollary 2, we know that the relative cost of implementing information-intensive actions
depends on the return to reputation-building. Let l1(θ) be the optimal level of discretion in the first
period, and recall that l2(θ) is the optimal level in the second period (and equals the optimal level of
discretion in the static model). We have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If the return to reputation-building is positive, then for any level of reputation θ,
the manager receives a higher level of discretion in the first period relative to the second period, i.e.,
l1(θ) ≥ l2(θ). If the return is negative, then there exists a value δ
∗ ≥ 12 , such that if the discount factor
is δ ≤ δ∗, then the level of discretion is lower in the first period, i.e., l1(θ) ≤ l2(θ).
When the return to reputation-building is positive, it is cheaper for the principal to induce the manager
to use his discretion productively, and the principal grants the manager greater authority. Conversely,
when the return to reputation-building is negative, the explicit incentives necessary to make the
manager use his discretion productively become relatively more costly (although the absolute cost of
incentives may go down). The principal responds by reducing the manager’s authority.
However, when the discount factor is sufficiently high, there may be cases in which the optimal
level of discretion is higher, although the returns to reputation building are negative. Notice from
equation (9), that the incentive payment for the standard action, σ1, is zero when b(l1) < δu2(θ)
(since incentive payments cannot be negative). It is optimal for the principal to increase l1 as long
as σ1 = 0.
13 Therefore, if the level of discretion at which σ1 becomes positive is sufficiently large,
13To be precise, it is optimal to do so unless θ − R + θβ1 < 0, in which case the value of the manager’s information is
lower than the cost of inducing the manager to utilize it (see equation (13)). In this case, the optimal level of discretion
is zero.
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then l1(θ) ≥ l2(θ) regardless of the returns to reputation-building. Intuitively, it is possible that the
positive career concerns (the lower absolute cost of implementing the standard action) outweigh the
negative career concerns (the higher relative cost of implementing information-intensive actions).14
Differentiating V1(l1) makes the relationship between authority and the returns to reputation-
building particularly clear. Assuming that the incentive payments are strictly positive and substituting
equations (11) and (12) for σ1 and θβ1, we obtain the following first order condition:
(θ −R) = v(l1)− δ(θu2(1)− u2(θ)) (14)
Equation (14) is the dynamic analogue to equation (7). At the optimal level of discretion, the expected
value of the manager’s information equals exactly the value required to compensate the principal for
the marginal cost of incentives; this value is v(l1) adjusted for the returns to reputation-building.
The key result in this section is that while implicit incentives discourage purely opportunistic be-
havior, it may actually become more costly to encourage the manager to take actions that are risky –
in the sense that the returns depend on the quality of the manager’s information – relative to the cost
of inducing managers to take a conservative action. This situation arises if the expected returns to
building a reputation are lower than the benefits of simply preserving a given reputation. Specifically,
if expected future compensation of the manager is concave in his reputation, the manager has an
incentive to behave conservatively. The principal optimally responds to such conservatism by limiting
the discretion of the manager relative to the static model. On the other hand, if the returns to building
a reputation are large, the manager has a strong incentive to use his discretion productively and is
allocated greater authority.
4 Dynamic Contracts
4.1 Dynamic Contracting without Commitment to Long-term Contracts
The success or failure of a project is revealing about a decision-maker’s ability only in proportion to
the scope of his or her authority. For instance, the performance of a division indicates little about
14The condition on δ in the second part of Proposition 4 ensures that the corner, where b(l1) = δu2(θ) is less than l2(θ), so
that the relative cost of incentives determines the level of discretion. The incentive payment, σ1, reflects the fact that if
the manager abuses his discretion, he suffers a complete loss of his reputational capital. If there is some noise in the profit
function, the severity of the market’s punishment for poor performance decreases, lowering the cost of pursuing private
benefits and increasing σ1. In this scenario, it can be shown that conditions on the discount factor are not necessary to
obtain the result in Proposition 4.
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the decision-making capability of the division manager if he is simply carrying out the orders of
the headquarters. In the previous section, if the principal grants the manager a first-period level of
discretion, l1, then with probability F (l1) the manager’s type is revealed to the market. Thus, future
lenders or employers are better able to assess the ability of managers who are given greater discretion
in past relationships. However, the informational benefits of discretion are ignored by current lenders
and employers if they do not anticipate future interactions with the manager. The analysis in this
section shows that when the relationship extends over multiple periods, the principal internalizes the
informational externality present early in the relationship, and increases discretion relative to a short-
term relationship. We now extend our analysis to the natural case where the relationship may span
both periods. While the principal and manager can engage in a long-term relationship, we assume
that the principal cannot commit to long-term contracts. If the manager is revealed to be uninformed
at the end of the first period, the principal rationally chooses to hire a new manager, whose reputation
is given by θ. Section 4.2 contains the analysis of long-term contracts. The notation for all variables is
the same as in the previous section, except a superscript R (relationship) is added to indicate repeated
interaction.
Absent commitment, the second-period contract must maximize the principal’s second-period profit
and is therefore
{
b
(
lR2 (θˆ)
)
/θˆ, b
(
lR2 (θˆ)
)
, [0, lR2 (θˆ)]
}
, where θˆ equals either the updated reputation of the
existing manager or equals θ when the principal hires a new manager. This contract yields the principal
an expected utility of V (lR2 (θˆ)), as given by equation (6) and is the principal’s expected utility in the
static model. Simplifying notation, we define V2(θˆ) ≡ V (l
R
2 (θˆ)). The principal’s minimum level of
utility in the second period is V2(θ) since she can always hire a manager with reputation θ.
Proposition 3 applies here as well, implying that the optimal first period contract is of the form
{βR1 , σ
R
1 , [0, l
R
1 ]} and the first-period incentive payments are given by equations (9) and (10). The
equilibrium incentive payments induce the manager to act on his information whenever he receives a
signal s1 ∈ [0, l
R
1 ] and take the standard action otherwise. The manager receives such a signal with
probability F (lR1 ) and with probability θ turns out to be the high type. In this case, the principal
rehires the manager and receives V2(1)− V2(θ) of additional utility over the baseline level of V2(θ).
Let Π(lR1 ) be the sum of the principal’s first and second-period expected payoffs when she offers
the manager a first-period level of discretion lR1 . Π(l
R
1 ) = V1(l
R
1 ) + δE[V2(θˆ)], where V1(l
R
1 ) is the
principal’s first-period expected utility as given by equation (13). Given our analysis of the second
period hiring decisions, the principal chooses the first-period level of discretion to maximize:
max
lR
1
∈[0,1]
Π(lR1 ) = V1(l
R
1 ) + δV2(θ) + δθ[V2(1)− V2(θ)]F (l
R
1 )
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The last term in the preceding equation, δθ[V2(1)−V2(θ)]F (l
R
1 ), captures the informational benefit of
giving the manager discretion early in the relationship. The greater the first-period level of discretion,
lR1 , the greater the likelihood that the principal learns about the manager’s ability and makes the
optimal hiring decision in the second period. Beyond this additional effect, the principal faces the
identical tradeoffs as in the previous section as δV2(θ) does not depend on the first-period discretion,
and thus has no impact on the level of discretion. It immediately follows that the optimal level
of discretion must be weakly greater than in a short-term relationship. Let lR1 (θ) be the optimal
level of discretion in the first period and (βR1 (θ), σ
R
1 (θ)) be the associated compensation package.
Recall that l1(θ) is the optimal first-period discretion when only short-term relationships are possible,
and let (β1(θ), σ1(θ)) denote the optimal incentives for this case. We have established the following
proposition:
Proposition 5 If the horizon of the relationship is extended, then the optimal level of discretion
and the corresponding incentive payments increase. Equivalently, lR1 (θ) ≥ l1(θ), β
R
1 (θ) ≥ β1(θ), and
σR1 (θ) ≥ σ1(θ).
Whereas in a short-lived relationship the informational benefit of discretion accrues to the future
employers and lenders and is ignored by the principal, the principal internalizes this benefit and
chooses a higher level of discretion in a long-term relationship. Throughout we have assumed that
θ > R. However, the informational benefit of discretion may cause the principal to delegate some
control even if θ < R. That is, even if the manager’s reputation is so low that the net expected
surplus generated from his decisions is negative in a static setting, the principal may give the manager
decision-making rights as a way of screening for informed managers.
4.2 Dynamic Contracting with Commitment to Long-term Contracts
Now we assume that the principal can commit to a long-term contract with the manager. At the
start of the relationship, the principal offers the manager not only an initial contract, C1, but also a
second-period contract, C2(pi1), contingent on the profit realized in the first period. This additional
commitment allows the principal to choose C2(pi1) to trade off second-period profits against current
profits. In particular, the principal can set the second-period level of discretion and incentive payments
in such a way that the manager has better incentives to take productive actions early in the relation-
ship. If the contract specifies that for a certain realization of profit the manager is not rehired, we
assume that the principal draws a new manager from the population with reputation θ. The notation
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for all variables remains the same, except a superscript L (long-term) is added to indicate the ability
of the principal to commit to long-term contracts.
We assume that the manager can also commit to maintaining the relationship, or equivalently that
the value of the manager’s outside option is always zero. This eliminates his incentive to end the
relationship if future payments are not sufficiently high.15
Suppose the principal offers a long-term contract L = {C1, C2(pi1)}. In the first period, the manager
receives a signal, s1, and takes an action, a
L
1 , realizing a profit, pi1. The manager’s updated probability
that he is of high ability is θˆ(s1, a
L
1 , pi1), where
θˆ(s1, a
L
1 , pi1) =


1 if aL1 = s1 and pi1 = 1
0 if aL1 = s1 and pi1 = 0
θ otherwise
Given his belief θˆ, the contract C2(pi1), and a second-period signal s2, the manager’s problem in the
second period is to choose an action aL2 to maximize E[u2 | s2, C2(pi1), θˆ], where E[u2 | s2, C2(pi1), θˆ]
is given by equation (1). Substituting the manager’s best response into equation (1) and taking
expectations over s2, the manager’s expected utility in the second period is given by
u2(pi1, θˆ) ≡ E[u2 |C2(pi1), θˆ].
Similarly, the principal’s expected profit in the second period is V2(pi1, θˆ) ≡ V (C2(pi1), θˆ), where V (·)
is given by equation (2). Note that both u2(pi1, θˆ) and V2(pi1, θˆ) depend on the choice of C2(pi1).
However, to simplify notation, we simply write payoffs as a function of pi1.
The principal’s first-period expected profit is V (C1) and her problem is to choose L to maximize
Π(L) ≡ V (C1) + δV2(pi1, θˆ). The next lemma is the long-term contracting analogue to Proposition 3
and characterizes the first period contract:
Lemma 3 In the optimal long-term contract, the manager is replaced whenever the first-period profit
is zero. In addition, the first-period contract C1 is of the form {β
L
1 , σ
L
1 , [0, l
L
1 ]}, and the incentive
payments are such that the manager’s first-period action is to use his information when possible and
15Relaxing this assumption does not alter the main conclusions of this section. If the manager cannot commit to a long-term
contract, the principal cannot depress the wages of managers with reputation θ, and there is the additional constraint
that managers with reputation θ have to receive at least as much utility in the long-term contract in period 2 as in an
alternative spot employment in the market. Otherwise, the analysis remains unchanged.
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take the standard action otherwise. Specifically, the optimal incentive payments σL1 and β
L
1 satisfy:
σL1 = max{b(l
L
1 )− δu2(R, θ), 0} (15)
θβL1 = max{σ
L
1 + δ(u2(R, θ)− θu2(1, 1)), 0}. (16)
The intuition underlying equations (15) and (16) is similar to that underlying equations (9) and (10).
However, the principal chooses the contract L to “fine tune” the payoffs u2(pi1, θˆ) and thus lower the
cost of incentives in the first period. In the previous section, these payments were exogenous in the
first-period from the point of view of the principal. When the incentive payments βL1 and σ
L
1 are
strictly positive, they are decreasing in the manager’s second-period utility u2(pi1, θˆ).
16 The principal
thus faces a tradeoff: she can lower the cost of incentives in the first period by giving the manager
additional discretion and compensation in the second period at the expense of second-period profit,
V2(pi1, θˆ).
The second-period contract, C2(pi1), is structured so that it maximizes V2(pi1, θˆ) subject to achieving
a desired level of expected utility for the manager. In order to increase u2(pi1, θˆ), the principal may
find it optimal to choose a second-period interval of discretion [k2, l2] with k2 > 0, even when there
is an increasing conflict of interest. In doing so, the principal essentially substitutes smaller actions
with larger actions, increasing the manager’s expected private benefit. It is difficult to compare the
second-period levels of discretion with and without long-term contracts when the principal opts to
compensate the manager by shifting the interval of discretion. To rule out the optimality of such
contracts we impose further conditions on our measure of the conflict of interests, v(·). In particular
we assume that v(·)/b(·) is increasing.
Recall that v(a) is the minimum expected value of information that justifies the granting of discretion
to the manager in the neighborhood of a when the principal is concerned only about her profit. Since
now the principal is also concerned about the utility of the manager in the second period, v(·)/b(·) –
the minimum required value of information per unit of private benefit – is now an appropriate measure
of the attractiveness of the tradeoff. Intuitively, when v(·)/b(·) is increasing, the conflict of interest is
rising faster than the private benefit, making it optimal once again to restrict the manager to actions
in the lower portion of the interval.
Lemma 4 If v(·)/b(·) is increasing, the optimal second-period contract C2(pi1) gives the manager an
interval of discretion [0, l2]. In addition, the manager takes the action corresponding to his signal when
16Note that when σL1 > 0, σ
L
1 = b(l
L
1 )− δu2(R, θ). It follows that β
L
1 = max{b(l
L
1 )− δθu2(1, 1), 0}, and β
L
1 is a function of
only u2(1, 1).
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possible and the standard action otherwise.
Let lL2 (pi1) be the degree of discretion granted to the manager in the second period after a profit of
pi1 is realized, and recall that l2(θˆ) is the second-period level of discretion the principal grants the
manager when there are no long-term contracts. We can now state our main result in this section:
Proposition 6 Long-term contracts allocate more control to successful managers in the second period
than spot market contracts, i.e., lL2 (1) ≥ l2(1). Moreover, either θu2(1, 1)− u2(R, θ) ≥ 0 or l
L
2 (1) = 1.
Intuitively, slightly raising the contingent level of authority lL2 (1) above l2(1) has no first order impact
on the principal’s profit in the second period since V2(1, 1) is maximized at l2(1). However, increasing
the second-period level of authority increases the manager’s utility u2(1, 1) and thus lowers the incen-
tive payment necessary to induce information-intensive actions, βL1 (see equation (16)). The principal
therefore benefits from promising managers that are successful in the first period greater authority
than they would receive in the spot market. The benefit of increasing the second-period discretion of
successful managers is particularly large when the return to reputation-building is strongly negative
(i.e., when θu2(1, 1)−u2(R, θ) is negative and β
L
1 is potentially large relative to σ
L
1 ). The second part
of Proposition 6 implies that optimal long-term contracts reward successful managers with sufficient
future discretion and compensation to eliminate (if possible) the bias towards conservative actions.
In contrast to lL2 (1), the comparative statics on the contingent level of discretion l
L
2 (R) are am-
biguous. Raising lL2 (R) above l2(θ) lowers the cost of inducing the manager to take the standard
action. However, when the return to reputation-building is negative, an increase in lL2 (R) raises the
relative cost of inducing the manager to take information-intensive actions. The principal may set
lL2 (R) < l2(θ) as a consequence.
5 Related Literature and Empirical Research
The static trade-off between information and control has been discussed extensively in the
literature. The delegation problem was initially analyzed by Holmstro¨m (1984) while Jensen and
Meckling (1992) focussed on strategies how organizations resolve the associated problems. Harris and
Raviv (1996) model the capital budgeting process of firms and show that when division managers
are more informed about the productivity of capital and have a preference for large investments,
the optimal mechanism involves spending limits. Several papers have explored the complementarity
between incentives and control. Prendergast (2002) shows that managers receive both greater dis-
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cretion and stronger incentives in environments characterized by complexity and uncertainty due to
their information advantage in such environments. Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) also establish the
complementarity between incentives and control, although for reasons unrelated to any information
advantage of managers. In their model, workers given greater freedom to allocate time to personal
activities must also receive stronger incentives to behave productively in work-related activities.
Aghion and Bolton (1992) consider a problem where investors not only give the entrepreneur mon-
etary incentives, but also retain control rights. The inability to write complete contracts and the
fact that neither party has the incentive to take the action that maximizes social surplus in all cir-
cumstances, makes it efficient to vary control rights across contingencies. In our model, while the
principal always has the incentive to choose the first-best action, the agent has an informational ad-
vantage. Control considerations arise due to the information asymmetry and not the incompleteness
of contracts (though limiting the set of feasible contracts aggravates the problem).
A more recent and related treatment is Alonso and Matouschek (2008), though they assume that
the principal is unable to commit to contingent transfers. They show that the contracting problem of a
principal who faces an informed but biased agent reduces to a delegation problem in which the principal
commits to a set of decisions from which the agent chooses his preferred one. Krishna and Morgan
(2008) study optimal contracting in a model with an uninformed principal and an informed agent
where the principal can commit to a payment scheme but retains ultimate decision-making authority.
They show that the optimal contract never induces the agent to fully reveal his information. Similar
to our analysis, both in Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Krishna and Morgan (2008) the results
depend on the degree of conflict of interests between the principal and the agent.
Most papers on delegation use a similar setup: (1) an organization consisting of a principal and
an agent must make a decision, (2) the agent has private information relevant for a jointly optimal
decision, and (3) the principal’s and agent’s individual preferences over decisions diverge. The con-
tracting assumptions with respect to decision and transfer rules, however, vary considerably. In
one extreme, Crawford and Sobel (1982) assume that the principal cannot commit to any decision or
transfer rule. In the other extreme, Krishna and Morgan (2008) assume that the principal can write
fully contingent decision and compensation contracts. The rest of the literature falls between these
two extremes. Dessein (2002) is close to Crawford and Sobel in that it also prohibits both transfer and
decision rules but allows the complete set of decision rights to be assigned to the principal or the agent.
Holmstro¨m (1984) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) allow for decision rules but prohibit transfer
rules. Our paper can be viewed as somewhat orthogonal to those two papers: we allow transfer rules
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but prohibit decision rules. We say “somewhat orthogonal” because while the agent cannot commit
to take a specific action in response to his information, the principal can commit to withhold a set of
actions from the agent. In this respect, our decision rights assignment is similar to Dessein (2002),
except it is continuous.
Our result on the dynamic aspect of granting authority to a manager, namely that it may be
profitable to grant “excessive” authority to an agent early on in a relation, has been discussed in the
literature, though in the context of eliciting information on whether or not the agent is “trustworthy”
and without considering a role for explicit monetary incentives. Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (2004)
introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where the principal can transfer
control to the agent but cannot commit herself to do so and use this notion to study the extent to
which control transfers allow an agent to reveal information regarding his willingness to cooperate with
the principal in the future. They show that, when control is transferable but not contractible, it can be
optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the way in which the agent exercises
control. Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1993) explain the use of legally unenforceable, discretionary
financial contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable contracts are feasible and argue that
discretionary contracts foster the development of reputation. Finally, Ichino and Muehlheusser (2008)
provide a result very similar to ours with regard to the monitoring decisions of a principal. They show
that a principal may refrain from monitoring early in a relationship to test whether an agent is the
type that exploits the possibility to misbehave.
Kaarbøe and Olsen (2006) analyze how the strength of explicit incentives evolves over
time, though in a context unrelated to a manager’s use of information and managerial conservatism.
Like our paper, they establish that career concerns may result in stronger explicit incentives early
in a manager’s career. However, Kaarbøe and Olsen (2006) argue in a multitasking framework that
career concerns may provide incentives to engage only in some tasks, making it necessary to provide
counterbalancing explicit incentives for other tasks.
Several papers have studied how career concerns affect both managerial behavior and job
design. While Fama (1980) argues that the labor market plays an important role in disciplining
managers, Holmstro¨m (1999) and Holmstro¨m and Ricart i Costa (1986) show that while this is correct
in some circumstances, career concerns can actually aggravate conflicts of interests. Similar to our
study, they show that career concerns may make it harder to motivate risk taking as managers may
underinvest in risky, but profitable, projects to preserve their reputational capital. In a related vein,
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Zwiebel (1995) show that managers have an incentive to mimic other
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managers, ignoring substantive private information, in order to avoid “standing out” and to protect
their reputations. Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003) even show that an agent’s desire to preserve his reputation
can in fact lead to the loss of the entire surplus in a transaction.
Our results on long-term contracts from subsection 4.2 apply to the pay and promotion policies
of organizations to the extent that organizations can commit to these policies. Kreps (1986) argues
that these practices in an organization, once in place, become the basis of an implicit contract between
the organization and its employees. The incentive of the organization to maintain its reputation enables
it to commit to promotion rules which are not necessarily ex post optimal. The questions of why pay
is typically convex in the rank, and why authority increases disproportionately as one moves up to the
top of the hierarchy also have received attention in prior research. For example, Rosen (1982) develops
a theory in which the steep increase in authority is the natural result of the benefits of matching scarce
talent to managerial positions. Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986) argue that the convex pay
profile does not reflect the productivity of top managers but rather provides lower level managers
with strong implicit incentives. Our model has both elements: successful managers are given greater
authority and their compensation eventually exceeds their marginal product in order to motivate them
early in their careers.
Several studies provide empirical support for our results. Magnan and St-Onge (1997) study
executive compensation in the commercial banking industry and find a statistically significant corre-
lation between measures of managerial discretion and the sensitivity of compensation to performance.
A more recent analysis of the same industry by Nagar (2002) shows that high growth and innovative
banks grant their branch managers greater authority and stronger incentives relative to their peers at
stable banks. This suggests that branch managers receive greater authority and incentives when their
tasks are more information intensive. Finally, it is natural to expect that stricter controls are placed
on managers in situations where there is a wide divergence of interests. In the context of corporate
governance, the severity of the conflict of interests, v, is in part determined by the quality of insti-
tutions which protect investor rights, lowering the returns to self-dealing by dominant shareholders
and managers. In this vein, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) argue that in countries with weaker protections, there is a bias away from forms of
finance which result in the separation of ownership and control.
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show that termination probabilities for young mutual fund managers
increase steeply with underperformance, but are fairly insensitive to overperformance. In the language
of our analysis, there is a negative return to reputation-building. Consistent with the incentives
24
to avoid “standing out”, the authors find that young managers hold more conventional portfolios.
Regarding the use of incentives, Dass, Massa, and Patgiri (2008) establish an empirical relation between
stronger contractual incentives and a reduction in herd behavior among fund managers. Finally,
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Kahn and Sherer (1990) study the relation between implicit and
explicit incentives as tenure increases. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) find cross-sectional evidence for
their above mentioned result, that chief executives receive stronger explicit incentives as they approach
retirement age whereas Kahn and Sherer (1990) analyze longitudinal data from a single firm and find,
in line with our predictions, that bonus payments of high-level managers are actually less sensitive to
performance as tenure increases. However, both Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Kahn and Sherer
(1990) measure the average sensitivity of pay to performance, whereas our theory suggests that the
sensitivity of pay to performance varies with the level of performance. The average sensitivity of pay
is a function of both the incentive payments for moderate, σ, and excellent performance, β. Since σ
always increases with tenure, the average sensitivity of pay to performance decreases with tenure only
if β decreases with tenure - which happens only if there are negative returns to reputation-building.
This suggests that in the sample of Kahn and Sherer, high-level managers with low seniority must be
given strong monetary incentives to counter implicit incentives to “play it safe”. On the other hand,
our analysis suggests that in Gibbons and Murphy’s sample of CEO’s, the rising average sensitivity
of pay to performance with tenure is largely due to changes in σ. This would indicate that the
prevention of blatant abuse of authority is a first-order consideration in the design of compensation
for the executives studied by Gibbons and Murphy.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the design of compensation schemes and the allocation of authority in a
dynamic principal-agent framework. We show that a manager’s discretion is increasing in the value
of his information and in the quality of his reputation, and decreasing in the severity of the conflict
of interests. Moreover, managers given greater discretion must receive larger monetary incentives to
align their interests with those of the principal. Our analysis implies that talented decision-makers
are given extensive control rights and receive generous incentive compensation.
With this intuitive interrelationship between information, authority, and incentives as a baseline, we
explore the role of career concerns. Career concerns lower the cost of explicit incentives necessary to
discourage clear forms of opportunism, since managers have an incentive to preserve their reputation.
However, in an effort to avoid negative inferences about their ability, managers may make overly
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conservative decisions, neglecting their own information. Implicit incentives may thus increase the
explicit incentives necessary to induce risk-taking. In such a scenario, the principal reduces managerial
discretion to economize on the increased cost of incentives.
These results link our model to theories of managerial conservatism in which career concerns cause
managers to undertake less innovative projects, despite their knowledge that such investments are
inferior. We show that a principal optimally preempts such behavior by both strengthening incentives
and limiting managerial authority. The costs of managerial conservatism thus include not only those
cases in which decision-makers choose to ignore valuable information, but also those cases in which
decision-makers are forced to ignore information as a result of the centralization of decision-making.
The allocation of control changes as the horizon of the relationship changes. Since it is easier to
infer the ability of managers if they have more authority, discretion serves as a screening device.
When the principal expects to engage in a long-term relationship with a manager, she internalizes
this informational benefit and gives the manager greater authority. Moreover, when the principal is
able to commit to long-term contracts, she rewards successful managers with greater authority and
compensation relative to what they would receive in the market in order to improve their incentives
early in the relationship. By increasing the returns to reputation-building, the principal weakens any
biases against risk-taking introduced by career concerns. This reasoning can provide insights into why
both decision-making authority and compensation increase rapidly as managers advance within the
hierarchies of organizations.
A A Mechanism Design Approach
In the main body of the paper, we assume that contracts are incomplete. The principal can con-
tractually allocate the decision rights over actions, but can base compensation only on the monetary
outcome of the project and not the specific action taken by the manager. We show here that relaxing
this assumption does not qualitatively change our results. We analyze the principal-agent relationship
using a mechanism design approach and demonstrate that identical tradeoffs arise when contracts are
complete.
Suppose the principal can commit to contracts that utilize all observable variables. Specifically, the
manager reports his signal, and the contract specifies an action and compensates the manager based
both both on the report and realized profit. It is well-known that in studying such contracts, one can
restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms (DRMs), in which the manager truthfully reports
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his signal, s. In light of this observation, the principal chooses a decision rule, a(s), and a payment
rule, w(s, pi), to solve the following problem
max
a(s),w(s,pi)
V [a(s), w(s, pi)]
s.t. s ∈ argmaxt∈[0,1] E[w(t, pi) + b(a(t))|s]
where the constraint is the manager’s incentive compatibility condition that must be satisfied for
truthful reporting. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we fix the decision rule and analyze how
the payments w(s, pi) must be structured in order to satisfy the incentive compatibility condition. We
then derive the principal’s optimal decision rule.
Consider an arbitrary decision rule, a(s), which specifies the action the manager should take based
on the signal reported by him. Given a(s), it is helpful to partition the set of signals into three subsets:
1) signals for which the rule specifies the standard action, 2) signals for which the rule specifies the
action corresponding to the signal, and 3) the remaining signals. We denote these subsets, respectively,
S¯, S∗, and Sˆ. Formally, S¯ = {s : a(s) = a¯}, S∗ = {s : a(s) = s}, and Sˆ = [0, 1]− S¯ − S∗.
The manager’s expected utility from sending message t when his signal is s is
E[w(t, pi) + b(a(t))|s] =


w(t, R) if a(t) = a¯
b(s) + θw(t, 1) + (1− θ)w(t, 0) if a(t) = s
b(a(t)) + w(t, 0) otherwise
First, observe that for all s ∈ S¯, w(s,R) has to be constant. If there were s1 and s2 in S¯ such that
w(s1, R) < w(s2, R), the manager would lie about s1, since he could increase his compensation by
reporting s2 instead. In other words, whenever the principal asks the manager to take the standard
action, the manager must be paid the same amount regardless of his signal. We have, w(s,R) = σ for
s ∈ S¯.
Second, for the manager to report truthfully when he receives a signal s ∈ S∗, it is necessary that
b(s)+θw(s, 1)+(1−θ)w(s, 0) ≥ σ. At the same time, expected profit maximization on the part of the
principal implies the condition will hold with equality. If not, she could increase profits by lowering
w(s, 1) on all s for which the inequality is strict. We therefore have, θw(s, 1)+(1−θ)w(s, 0) = σ−b(s)
for s ∈ S∗.
Finally, for all s ∈ Sˆ, b(a(s)) + w(s, 0) = σ. That is, when the manager receives a signal for which
the rule specifies an action other than standard action or the action corresponding to the signal, he
must be compensated σ to truthfully reveal this signal. (We show below that the optimal Sˆ is in fact
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empty.) If there was s1 ∈ Sˆ such that b(a(s1)) + w(s1, 0) < σ, the manager would prefer to lie and
report a signal that leads to the implementation of the standard action. Conversely, if the inequality
held the other way, the manager would prefer to lie about signals in S¯, since he would do better by
reporting s1.
To summarize, we have shown that for an arbitrary decision rule a(s), incentive compatibility and
profit maximization imply:
w(s, R) = σ for all s ∈ S¯
θw(s, 1) + (1− θ)w(s, 0) = σ − b(s) for all s ∈ S∗
w(s, 0) = σ − b(a(s)) for all s ∈ Sˆ
Intuitively, to induce truthful revelation of information the principal designs compensation in a way
that makes the manager indifferent among all messages that he may send. For actions that provide
the manager with private benefits, monetary compensation is correspondingly reduced.
We are now ready to derive the optimal decision rule. Taking into account the restrictions on the
payment rule summarized in the preceding paragraph, the principal’s expected profit from implement-
ing a decision rule a(s) is given by
V [a(s), w(s, pi)] =
∫
S¯
(R− σ)f(s)ds +
∫
S∗
[θ − σ + b(s)]f(s)ds−
∫
Sˆ
[σ − b(a(s))]f(s)ds (17)
The limited liability constraint requires that σ− b(a(s)) ≥ 0 for s ∈ Sˆ (the manager’s compensation
cannot be negative). It follows that when the manager reports a signal in Sˆ it costs the principal
in terms of wages, but yields no benefit. As we establish below, R − σ > 0 implying that principal
benefits when the manager takes the standard action. It follows that Sˆ must be empty, since the the
principal can increase her profit by instructing the manager to take the standard action for all signals
s ∈ Sˆ.
Limited liability also requires that σ − b(s) ≥ 0 for s ∈ S∗. Let l = supS∗. It then follows that σ
must be at least as high as b(l). Since the principal’s profit is decreasing in σ, it also follows that the
optimal σ does not exceed b(l). Therefore, σ = b(l) < R, and equation (17) simplifies to
V (·) =
∫
S¯
[R− b(l)]f(s)ds +
∫
S∗
[θ − b(l) + b(s)]f(s)ds
= R Pr(S¯) + θ Pr(S∗)− b(l) +
∫
S∗
b(s)f(s)ds
Finally, recall that θ > R. It thus cannot be optimal to ask the manager to take the standard
action for signals s ≤ l. By asking the manager to take the action corresponding to the signal instead,
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the principal both raises her expected revenue and lowers the expected cost of incentives because the
manager is partially compensated through private benefits. We conclude that the optimal set S∗ has
the form of [0, l] and the principal’s goal is to maximize
V (·) = R + (θ −R)F (l)− b(l) +
∫ l
0
b(s)f(s)ds
The only difference between the preceding equation and the principal’s maximization problem when
contracts are incomplete (equation (6)) is the additional term
∫ l
0 b(s)f(s)ds. This term represents the
expected private benefits of the manager. When contracts are complete and the principal is able to
make the manager’s compensation dependent on the action, she “charges” the manager for his private
benefits and lowers the amount of explicit compensation.
Beyond this difference, the principal faces the same tradeoff as in the static model. By allowing
her decision to depend upon the manager’s report (i.e., by giving the manager real authority), the
principal earns (θ − R)F (l) in additional expected revenue. However, to ensure that the manager
does not opportunistically distort his information, the principal must compensate him for the loss of
private benefit. The total cost of the incentive compensation is b(l)−
∫ l
0 b(s)f(s)ds (versus b(l)), and
the optimal level of discretion trades off the additional expected revenue against the associated cost
of incentives.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose C = {β, σ,A} maximizes the principal’s profit. To establish the Lemma, it suffices to show
that there is an interval [k, l] such that the modified contract C˜ = {β, σ, [k, l]} satisfies V (C˜) = V (C)
and a∗(s, C˜) = s for s ∈ [k, l] and a∗ = a¯ otherwise. Let A¯ = {s : a∗(s, C) = s}. A¯ is the set of signals
at which the manager takes the action corresponding to his signal. If Pr[ω ∈ A¯] = 0, then allowing
the manager discretion has no benefit for the principal. Therefore, restricting the manager to {a¯} or
{a¯, 0} achieves the same level of profit. In this case, the degenerate interval [k, l] = [0, 0] satisfies the
proposition.
Suppose that Pr[ω ∈ A¯] > 0, and let l = maxA (recall that A is compact so that l is well-defined).
Using the agent’s expected payoff from taking an action (see equation (1)), it must be the case that
θβ + b(s) ≥ max{σ, b(l)} for any signal s ∈ A¯. It follows that for any signal z greater than s,
θβ + b(z) ≥ max{σ, b(l)} and a∗(z, C) = z, provided z is in A. In particular, this argument implies
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that l ∈ A¯.
Now suppose that the principal offers the manager, the revised contract J = {β, σ, A¯}. Since l ∈ A¯,
the action that maximizes private benefit is unchanged under the new contract. In addition, the payoff
to the standard action remains unchanged. Since the revised contract contains exactly those actions
which the manager chooses to take under the original contract, and since the payoffs from taking those
actions are unchanged, a∗(s, J) = a∗(s, C) for all s ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, V (C) = V (J).
Let k = min A¯, and let Z = [k, l] − A¯. Z is the set of actions between k and l which the manager
cannot take. Since a∗(k, J) = k, if the manager receives a signal z > k in Z, he would choose
a = z if the action were allowed. Given that the contract J maximizes the principal’s profit and
Pr[ω ∈ A¯] > 0, the payoff for the principal when the manager takes the action corresponding to his
signal is higher than if the manager chooses the standard action. In particular, it must be the case
that θ(1−β) ≥ R−σ. If not, the principal could achieve a higher profit by completely restricting the
manager to the standard action. Therefore, if the manager receives a signal z in Z, the principal would
be better off if the manager were allowed to take the action corresponding to the signal. Therefore,
V (β, σ, [k, l]) ≥ V (J). The optimality of J implies that V (β, σ, [k, l]) = V (J).
Let C˜ = {β, σ, [k, l]}. We have already shown that a∗(s, C˜) = s for s ∈ [k, l]. It remains to show
that a∗(s, C˜) = a¯ otherwise. For s 6∈ [k, l], a∗(s, C˜) = a¯ if σ ≥ b(l). Under the assumption that
R > b(1) ≥ b(l), it always pays for the principal to increase social surplus and make the standard
action incentive compatible. Therefore, the optimality of C implies that a∗(s, C˜) = a¯ if s 6∈ [k, l].
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 1, we can restrict attention to contracts for which a∗(s) = s for s ∈ [k, l], and a∗(s) = a¯,
otherwise. From the manager’s payoff function as given by equation (1), it follows that if a∗(s) = s
for s ∈ [k, l], then θβ + b(s) ≥ σ for s ∈ [k, l]. In addition, if a∗(s) = a¯ for s /∈ [k, l], then σ ≥ b(l).
These two inequalities together imply that θβ ≥ b(l)− b(k).
Let ∆F = F (l)− F (k). The principal’s expected profit from {β, σ, [k, l]} is
V (β, σ, [k, l]) = (1− β)θ Pr
[
a∗(s) = s
]
+ (R− σ) Pr
[
a∗(s) = a¯
]
= (1− β)θ(∆F ) + (R− σ)(1−∆F )
Note that (1−β)θ ≥ R−σ; otherwise, the principal could increase her profit by reducing the discretion
of the manager, violating the optimality of the contract.
Choose z such that b(z) = b(l)− b(k) (since b(0) = 0, continuity ensures that such a point exists).
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Let G = F ◦ b−1. The assumption that v is increasing, ensures that G is concave. In particular, for
any h and w, G(h) ≥ G(w + h)−G(w). Letting h = b(z) and w = b(k), we have that F (z) = G(h) ≥
G(w + h)−G(w) = ∆F .
Consider the revised contract {β, σ′, [0, z]} where σ′ = b(z), and let aˆ∗(s) be the manager’s new
best response function. Since θβ ≥ b(l) − b(k) = b(z) = σ′, the manager will choose to utilize his
information whenever possible, and is indifferent between the standard action and the action that
maximizes his private benefit, z. Therefore, aˆ∗(s) = s for s ∈ [0, z], and aˆ∗(s) = a¯ otherwise. The
principal’s expected profit from this contract is V (β, σ′, [0, z]) = (1− β)θF (z) + (R− σ′)(1− F (z)).
If z < l, then σ′ < σ. This inequality, together with inequalities, F (z) ≥ ∆F and (1− β)θ ≥ R− σ,
imply that V (β, σ′, [0, z]) > V (β, σ, [k, l]), contradicting the optimality of {β, σ, [k, l]}. Therefore,
k = 0 and z = l, which completes the proof.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let V (l) = (θ − R)F (l) − b(l) + R. Then V ′(l) = f(l)[(θ − R) − v(l)]. Recall that v is assumed to
be strictly increasing. This is sufficient to ensure that the second order conditions are satisfied and
that v(0) < (θ − R) < v(1).17 In this case there is a unique l∗ such that θ − R = v(l∗). Since V is
strictly increasing for l < l∗ and decreasing for l > l∗, l∗ is the unique maximum, establishing the first
statement of the Proposition. Finally, it is easily verified that l∗ is increasing in θ, and decreasing in
R and v.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that the principal offers the manager a first-period contract C = {β1, σ1,A1} and that the
markets beliefs in the second period are θˆ(a1, pi1). In addition, recall that the manager’s equilibrium
payoff in the second period is u2(θˆ(a1, pi1)). The manager’s expected utility from taking action a1 in
the first period, conditional on observing signal s1, is
E[u1 + δu2|s1, C] =


θβ1 + b(s1) + θδu2(θˆ(s1, 1)) + (1− θ)δu2(θˆ(s1, 0)) if a1 = s1
σ1 + δu2(θˆ(a¯, R)) if a1 = a¯
b(a1) + δu2(θˆ(a1, 0)) otherwise .
(18)
17If (θ−R) ≤ v(0) then V is strictly decreasing over the entire interval [0, 1], and l∗ = 0 is the unique maximum. Similarly,
if (θ −R) ≥ v(1), then V is strictly increasing, and l∗ = 1 is the maximum.
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We first show that for any contract, C, there is an equilibrium in the continuation game such that
the manager’s best response to C is always to choose one of two actions: the action corresponding to
his information and either the standard action or the action that maximizes private benefits.
If σ1 + δu2(θ) ≥ b(l1), consider the following best response and beliefs:
a∗1 =


s1 if s1 ∈ A¯
a¯ otherwise
and θˆ =


1 if pi1 = 1
θ if pi1 = R
0 if pi1 = 0
(19)
where A¯ = {s1 ∈ A1 : θβ1 + δθu2(1) + b(s1) ≥ σ1 + δu2(θ)}. Given these beliefs, it follows from
the payoff function (18) and the definition of A¯ that a∗1 is indeed a best response for the manager.
Conversely, we can show that θˆ is consistent with Bayes rule whenever applicable. Given a∗1, any action
a1 ∈ A¯ is taken if and only if s1 = a1. It follows that conditional on observing the manager take any
such action, updated beliefs are θˆ = pi1, pi1 ∈ {0, 1}, since high types generate a profit of 1 with a
probability of 1 and low types generate a profit of 0 with a probability of 1. No action a1 ∈ A1 − A¯
is ever taken, hence the conditional probability can be arbitrarily set as θˆ(a1, pi1) = pi1, pi1 ∈ {0, 1}
as well. Finally, since the probability that the manager takes action a¯ is independent of his type and
since the profit generated from a¯ is independent of his type as well, the inference when a1 = a¯ remains
unchanged. That is, θˆ(a¯, R) = θ.
If instead σ1 + δu2(θ) < b(l1), there is an equilibrium of the continuation game given by,
a∗1 =


s1 if s1 ∈ A¯
l1 otherwise
and θˆ =


1 if pi1 = 1
θ if pi1 = R
θ if pi1 = 0, a1 = l1, and Pr[a
∗
1 = l1] > 0
0 otherwise
where A¯ = {s1 ∈ A1 : θβ1 + δθu2(1) + b(s1) ≥ b(l1) + δu2(θ)}. Again, given the beliefs, the definition
of A¯ and the payoff function (18), it is easy to verify that a∗1 is a best response. Also, given the
manager’s behavior, any action a1 ∈ A¯ − {l1} is taken if and only if s1 = a1, and the conditional
probability is therefore θˆ(a1, pi1) = pi1, pi1 ∈ {0, 1}. No action a1 ∈ A1 − A¯ ∪ {l1} is ever taken, and
the conditional probability can be arbitrarily set as θˆ(a1, pi1) = pi1, pi1 ∈ {0, 1} as well. Action l1 is
either taken with a positive probability, in which case θˆ(l1, 1) = 1 and θˆ(l1, 0) = θ, or it is taken only
when s1 = l1, in which case θˆ(l1, 1) = 1 and θˆ(l1, 0) = 0. Finally, action a¯ is never taken, and the
conditional probability can be arbitrarily assigned the value θ.
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It follows that (a∗1, θˆ) is an equilibrium of the continuation game, given C. We can now analyze
the principal’s optimal choice of C in light of this equilibrium. Given our assumption that b(1) < R,
the principal always prefers to induce the manager to take the standard action rather than the action
that maximizes his private benefit. Therefore, σ1 is chosen to satisfy, σ1 + δu2(θ) ≥ b(l1), and
the equilibrium of the continuation game, given by (19), applies. The manager’s expected payoff is
therefore:
E[u1 + δu2|s1, C] =


θβ1 + b(s1) + θδu2(1) if a1 = s1
σ1 + δu2(θ) if a1 = a¯
b(a1) otherwise .
The payoff from taking any given action differs by at most a constant from his payoffs in the static
setting (equation (1)). Furthermore, the principal’s profit function is unchanged and is given by
equation (2). Therefore, Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, with minor modifications, apply in this context
as well. It follows that the principal allows the manager to choose an action from a set of the form
[0, l1].
It remains to characterize the principal’s choice of β1 and σ1. Given the manager’s expected payoffs,
to induce him to choose a¯ when s1 /∈ [0, l1] and to take the action corresponding to his signal when
s1 ∈ [0, l1], it must be the case that:
σ1 + δu2(θ) ≥ b(l1) (20)
θβ1 + θδu2(1) + b(a1) ≥ σ1 + δu2(θ) for a1 ∈ [0, l1]. (21)
In addition to these conditions, the optimal contract must satisfy the following nonnegativity condi-
tions: σ1 ≥ 0 and β1 ≥ 0. At the optimum, either equation (20) binds or σ1 = 0. Similarly, either
equation (21) binds or β1 = 0. These conditions reduce to equations (9) and (10), completing the
proof.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Adding and subtracting b(l1) from the principal’s profit function given in (13), the function can be
re-written as V1(l1) = V2(l1) + (σ1 − θβ1)F (l1) + b(l1)− σ1, where V2 is the principal’s profit function
in the second period and is equal to the profit function in the static setting as given by equation (6).
Recall that σ1 = max{b(l1) − δu2(θ), 0} and θβ1 = max{σ1 + δ(u2(θ) − θu2(1)), 0}, and note that
−max(z) = min(−z) for any function z. We can write σ1 − θβ1 = σ1 + min{δ(θu2(1) − u2(θ)) −
σ1, 0} = min{δ(θu2(1) − u2(θ)), σ1}. Notice that δ(θu2(1) − u2(θ)) is independent of l1 and σ1 is
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weakly increasing in l1. σ1 is non-negative, and if reputation-building has positive expected return,
δ(θu2(1) − u2(θ)) is non-negative as well. Therefore, (σ1 − θβ1)F (l1) is a weakly increasing function
of l1. Using the expression for σ1, b(l1) − σ1 = b(l1) + min{δu2(θ) − b(l1), 0} = min{δu2(θ), b(l1)},
which is also weakly increasing in l1. Since V1(l1) = V2(l2) + g(l1), where g(·) is a weakly increasing
function, it must be the case that the level of discretion that maximizes V1 is greater than the level of
discretion that maximizes V2. Equivalently, l1(θ) ≥ l2(θ).
Assume the expected return to reputation-building is negative. Then, using the expression derived
above, (σ1 − θβ1) = δ(θu2(1) − u2(θ)), which is negative and independent of l1. It follows that
(σ1− θβ1)F (l1) is a weakly decreasing function of l1. Define lσ to be the value of l1 at which σ1 starts
taking positive values. That is, b(lσ) = δu2(θ). On the interval [lσ, 1], b(l1)−σ1 = min{δu2(θ), b(l1)} =
δu2(θ), which is constant in l1. It follows that for l1 ≥ lσ, V1(l1) = V2(l1)+d(l1), where d(·) is a weakly
decreasing function. Set δ∗ = 11+F (l2(θ)) ≥ 1/2, and consider δ ≤ δ
∗. Using the definition of lσ and
equation (8), we have that b(lσ) = δu2(θ) = δ[b(l2(θ)) +
∫ l2(θ)
0 b(s)dF (s)] ≤ δ[b(l2(θ))(1 + F (l2(θ))] ≤
δ∗[b(l2(θ))(1 + F (l2(θ))] = b(l2(θ)). Therefore, it must be that l2(θ) > lσ. This fact together with the
fact that V1(l1) = V2(l1) + d(l1) for l1 ≥ lσ implies that l1(θ) ≤ l2(θ).
B.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Recall that given a long-term contract L = {C1, C2(pi1)}, the manager’s second-period expected payoff
is u2(pi1, θˆ). The sum of the manager’s first and second-period expected payoffs given a first-period
signal s1 is therefore:
E[u1 + δu2|s1, C] =


θβL1 + b(s1) + θδu2(1, 1) + (1− θ)δu2(0, 0) if a
L
1 = s1
σL1 + δu2(R, θ) if a
L
1 = a¯
b(aL1 ) + δu2(0, θ) otherwise .
(22)
Similarly, recall that the principal’s second-period expected profit is V2(pi1, θˆ) and that Π(L) is the
sum of the first and second-period expected payoffs. We have that
Π(L) = [θ(1− βL1 ) + δ(θV2(1, 1) + (1− θ)V2(0, 0)] Pr[a
∗
1(s1) = s1]
+
(
R− σL1 + δV2(R, θ)
)
Pr[a∗1(s1) = a¯] + δV2(0, θ) Pr[a
∗
1(s1) 6= s1]. (23)
The arguments used to establish Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 apply here as well.18 The first-period
contract thus takes the form C1 = {β
L
1 , σ
L
1 , [0, l
L
1 ]} and a
∗
1 = s1 for s1 ∈ [0, l
L
1 ], and a
∗
1 = a¯ otherwise.
18For the most part, the proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 require only slight modifications to reflect the changes in the
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Equation (22) implies that the manager will behave in this manner only if
σL1 + δu2(R, θ) ≥ b(l
L
1 ) + δu2(0, θ)
θβL1 + b(a
L
1 ) + θδu2(1, 1) + (1− θ)δu2(0, 0) ≥ σ
L
1 + δu2(R, θ) for a
L
1 ∈ [0, l
L
1 ].
These conditions, together with the requirement that σL1 and β
L
1 be positive, imply that the optimal
choice of βL1 and σ
L
1 must satisfy
σL1 = max{b(l
L
1 ) + δ(u2(0, θ)− u2(R, θ)), 0} (24)
θβL1 = max{σ
L
1 + δ(u2(R, θ)− θu2(1, 1)− (1− θ)u2(0, 0)), 0}. (25)
Given the form of C1, the manager only generates zero profit in the first period if he is the low type.
Clearly, the principal can obtain a higher second-period payoff by firing the manager and hiring a new
manager with reputation θ. It is optimal for the principal to rehire the manager when profits are zero
only if doing so lowers the cost of incentives in the first period. Suppose the principal rehires a poorly
performing manager and offers him a contract such that u2(0, 0) > 0. Note that u2(0, θ) ≥ u2(0, 0),
since a manager with reputation θ can generate at least as much expected compensation from a contract
as a manager with reputation 0. Equations (24) and (25) imply that rehiring a manager after poor
performance weakly increases σL1 and lowers θβ
L
1 by a maximum value of δ(1−θ)u2(0, 0). By completely
restricting the manager to the standard action and giving him zero compensation in the second period,
the principal increases her expected second period payoff by at least F (lL1 )δ(1− θ)u2(θ, θ). It follows
that u2(0, 0) = 0, in which case the principal is better off simply firing the existing manager and hiring
a new manager. Substituting u2(0, 0) = u2(0, θ) = 0 into equations (24) and (25) gives equations (15)
and (16) and completes the proof.
payoffs of the manager and principal. However, additional analysis is necessary to establish that it is always optimal for
the manager to either use his information or take the standard action. Consider a contract L = {C1, C2(π1)} in which
the manager sometimes takes neither of these actions, implying Pr[a∗1(s1) 6= s1] > 0. Let l
L
1 be the largest action that
the manager can take in contract C1. Since the manager opts to pursue pure private benefits, it must be the case that
σL1 +δu2(R, θ) < b(l
L
1 )+δu2(0, θ) and the manager never opts to take the standard action in the first period (equivalently,
Pr[a∗1(s1) = a¯] = 0). Let C˜2(R) = C2(0), and let V˜2(R, θ) and u˜2(R, θ) denote the principal’s and manager’s expected
payoffs from C˜2(R). Note that V˜2(R, θ) = V2(0, θ) and u˜2(R, θ) = u2(0, θ). Let σ˜1 = b(l
L
1 ). Finally, let L˜ = L, except
with the new contractual terms C˜2(R) and σ˜1. This contract induces the manager to take the standard action instead
of abusing his discretion. Given that σL1 ≤ b(1) < R, R− σ˜1 + δV˜2(R, θ) > δV2(0, θ). It follows that L˜ generates a higher
payoff for the principal.
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B.7 Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose C2(pi1) maximizes the principal’s second-period expected profit, V2(pi1, θˆ), subject to the man-
ager’s second-period expected utility, u2(pi1, θˆ), exceeding some minimum threshold u¯. By the same ar-
guments used to prove Lemma 1, we can restrict our analysis to contracts of the form {βL2 , σ
L
2 , [k
L
2 , l
L
2 ]},
where βL2 and σ
L
2 are such that a
∗
2 = s2 for s2 ∈ [k
L
2 , l
L
2 ] and equals a¯ otherwise.
Consider an interval [kL2 , l
L
2 ], with k
L
2 > 0. To induce the manager to utilize his information when
possible and take the standard action otherwise, it must be the case that θˆβL2 = b(l
L
2 ) − b(k
L
2 ), and
σL2 = b(l
L
2 ). Let ∆F = F (l
L
2 )− F (k
L
2 ). The principal’s expected profit from C2(pi1) is
V2(pi1, θˆ) = R + (θˆ −R)∆F − (b(l
L
2 )− b(k
L
2 ))− (1−∆F )b(k
L
2 )
while the manager’s expected utility is
u2(pi1, θˆ) = b(l
L
2 )− b(k
L
2 ) + (1−∆F )b(k
L
2 ) +
∫ lL
2
kL
2
b(s2)f(s2) ds2.
Let Γ(t) =
∫ t
0 b(s2)f(s2)ds2 and H = Γ ◦ b
−1. Choose z such that b(z) = b(lL2 ) − b(k
L
2 ), and
consider an alternative contract in which θˆβ′2 = σ
′
2 = b(z) and the interval of discretion is [0, z]. In
addition, suppose the contract gives the manager a base wage of (1 − ∆F )b(kL2 ). The assumption
that v/b is increasing ensures that H is concave. Letting h = b(z) and w = b(kL2 ) we have that∫ z
0b(s2)f(s2) ds2 = H(h) ≥ H(w + h) − H(w) =
∫ lL
2
kL
2
b(s2)f(s2) ds2, which implies that the manager’s
expected utility is higher under the alternative contract. Furthermore, the monotonicity of b and
v/b implies that v is increasing as well. From the proof of Proposition 1, we have that F (z) ≥ ∆F .
This implies that the alternative contract also results in a higher expected profit for the principal.
Therefore, it is not optimal to set kL2 > 0.
B.8 Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose the optimal long term contract, L, gives the manager a first-period level of discretion lL1 and a
contingent second-period level of discretion lL2 (pi1). Recall from Lemmas 3 and 4 that the optimal first
and second-period incentive payments are such that the manager uses his information when possible
and takes the standard action otherwise. Substituting L into equation (23), the sum of the principal’s
first and second-period expected payoffs is:
Π(L) = R + (θ −R)F (lL1 ) + [θ(δV2(1, 1)− β
L
1 ) + (1− θ)δV2(0, 0)]F (l
L
1 )
+ [δV2(R, θ)− σ
L
1 ][1− F (l
L
1 )].
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The only term in Π(L) that depends on lL2 (1) is θ(δV2(1, 1)−β
L
1 ). Recall that V2(1, 1) is maximized
at l2(1). From equation (16), we have that θβ
L
1 = max{σ
L
1 + δ(u2(R, θ)− θu2(1, 1), 0}. The only term
in this equation that varies with lL2 (1) is u2(1, 1). u2(1, 1) is increasing in l
L
2 (1), implying that β
L
1 is
decreasing in lL2 (1). Since l
L
2 (1) maximizes Π(L) and thus θ(δV2(1, 1)− β
L
1 ), it must be the case that
lL2 (1) ≥ l2(1).
Suppose that θu2(1, 1)−u2(R, θ) < 0. In this case, θ(δV2(1, 1)−β
L
1 ) = θδV2(1, 1)−σ
L
1 −δ(u2(R, θ)−
θu2(1, 1)). A calculation establishes that V2(1, 1)+u2(1, 1) = R+(1−R)F (l
L
2 (1))+
∫ lL
2
(1)
0 b(s2)f(s2)ds2.
This expression is clearly increasing in lL2 (1). Since σ
L
1 and u2(R, θ) do not depend on l
L
2 (1), it follows
that θ(δV2(1, 1)−β
L
1 ) is also increasing in l
L
2 (1). Therefore, if θu2(1, 1)−u2(R, θ) < 0 in the equilibrium
contract, it must be the case that lL2 (1) = 1.
C Selection of the Equilibrium in the Dynamic Game
Step 1) If the manager ever follows signal s with positive probability, then it has to hold for the belief
Θ that Θ(type = high|pi = 1) = 1. This is implied by our specification of the informed type and the
0-1 nature of the profit function.
Step 2) Therefore, if, in equilibrium, Θ(type = high|pi = 1) < 1, it must be the case that s is
not followed with positive probability. In other words, the occurrence of a profit of 1 must lie off the
equilibrium path and the beliefs are thus unconstrained by Bayes rule.
Conditional on not following the signal s with positive probability, the manager has only two options:
(A) choosing another action a realizing a profit of zero, and receiving the corresponding transfer of
zero.
(B) choosing the standard action a¯, realizing a profit of R, and receiving the corresponding transfer
of zero.
(A) can not be an equilibrium since the principal can do strictly better by taking action a away
from the agent, thus forcing him to take the standard action a¯.
Hence, if Θ(type = high|pi = 1) < 1 in equilibrium, the equilibrium must have the manager always
choose the standard action.
Step 3) If it is possible for the manager to follow signal s and it is always followed, then Θ(type =
high|pi = 0) = 0. This again follows from our assumptions.
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Step 4) Therefore, if, in equilibrium, Θ(type = high|pi = 0) > 0, we can have only one of two
situations:
(a) a profit of zero occurs in equilibrium and the probability is derived using Bayes rule.
(b) a profit of zero never occurs in equilibrium and the probability is unconstrained by Bayes rule.
(a) implies that it is possible to follow the signal but the manager sometimes chooses another action
a followed by a profit of zero. However, this is not optimal since the principal can do strictly better
by taking action a away from the manager and force him to take the standard action a¯ instead. Hence
if, in equilibrium Θ(type = high|pi = 0) > 0, a profit of zero never occurs, and the equilibrium must
have the manager always choosing the standard action.
Thus, we can partition all the equilibria of the game into two subsets:
i) those where the manager always takes the standard action.
ii) those where the manager sometimes does not take the standard action.
In the class of equilibria in which the manager always takes the standard action it has to hold that
the belief for pi = R equals θ and the beliefs for pi = 0 and pi = 1 are not pinned down. Hence
there exists a continuum of degenerate equilibria which are all outcome-equivalent and only differ in
supporting beliefs.
The conclusions of Step 2) and Step 4) imply that if the manager sometimes does not take the
standard action in equilibrium the beliefs must be Θ(type = high|pi = 1) = 1 and Θ(type = high|pi =
0) = 0. Furthermore, it must also be the case that Θ(type = high|pi = R) = θ since a profit of R
is always on the equilibrium path and Bayes rule implies the posterior probability is θ. I.e., in all
such equilibria the beliefs are as specified in Proposition 3. For these beliefs, this equilibrium is the
unique sequentially rational equilibrium (see Kreps and Wilson (1982)). The second period game has
a unique solution as we have proved in section 2. Rolling back to the first period, we construct the
unique first-period part of the equilibrium through the proof of Proposition 3. Hence, there is a unique
“interesting” equilibrium that we analyze.
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